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The Effect of Town of Greece v. Galloway on the Use and Display of Religious Symbols
on Public Property.
Harrison Colby
The interpretation of the Establishment Clause by the Court in Galloway v. Town of Greece1
more readily allows for governments to maintain religious symbols on public property.2 The
Court’s holding in Town of Greece did so by loosening the restrictions on government
“endorsement” and as such, has paved the way for a broader showing, use, and maintenance of
religious symbols by governmental entities, without regard to the locale of the symbols. Though
Town of Greece did not involve religious symbols, the Court’s analysis of the claim set a path for
the Court to follow in American Legion v. American Humanist Association3 and ultimately led to
this broader acceptance of religious symbols.
Section I will discuss the history and case law of legislative prayer. Section II will discuss the
history of religious symbols maintained by government entities. Section III will discuss the effect
Town of Greece had on the Court’s most recent decision in American Legion. Section IV will
explore the intricacies of the new interpretations of the Establishment Clause and examine
whether – through Town of Greece and American Legion – the Court has paved the way for a
broader showing, use, and maintenance of religious symbols by governmental agencies.
I.

History of Legislative Prayer

Government and religion have long stood as the two separate pillars of our nation. While
separate, there have been times in which the two intertwine. The most obvious and continuous
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example is prayer in the beginning of a legislative session. 4 In Marsh v. Chambers this practice
was challenged by a member of the legislature, claiming the practice violated the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment.5 The practice in Nebraska was to open each session with a
prayer performed by a chaplain, who was paid out of public funds.6 The district court denied the
motion for dismissal on the grounds of legislative immunity, but upheld the practice of the
prayer, so long as the chaplain was not paid via public funds. 7
The appellate court applied the three-part test which was formulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman,
finding the practice to violate all three of the prongs. 8 The court found that by choosing the same
chaplain for over sixteen years, the legislature’s purpose was to promote the religious sect the
chaplain was a part of.9 Even if the purpose of the practice was in fact not to promote the
chaplains particular sect, the primary effect of choosing the same chaplain for over sixteen years
was promoting his religion.10 As to the third prong, the appellate court found that the payments
made to the chaplain constituted entanglement under the Establishment Clause, and thus
enjoined the practice entirely.11
The Supreme Court reversed the decision. “The opening of sessions of legislative and other
deliberative public bodies with prayer is deeply embedded in the history and tradition of this
country.”12 Prayer has coexisted with disestablishment and religious freedom since colonial
times.13 Courts at all levels, including the Supreme Court, begin their sessions with a speech
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Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 at 784 (1983).
Id. at 785.
6 Id. at 784-85.
7 Id. at 785.
8 Id. at 786 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)).
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which concludes, “God save the United States and this Honorable Court.”14 While no prayers
were offered at the constitutional convention, the First Congress quickly elected its first chaplain,
and a statute was formulated to pay the chaplains as early as September 1789.15 Three days after
the statute to pay chaplains was passed, the Bill of Rights was completed. 16 “Clearly the men
who wrote the First Amendment Religion Clauses did not view paid legislative chaplains and
opening prayer as a violation of that Amendment, for the practice of opening sessions with
prayer has continued without interruption ever since that early session of Congress.”17
Historical practice is not enough alone to support the practice today, but in Marsh the
historical evidence sheds light on the intentions of the draftsmen and how they thought the
Establishment Clause should apply.18 One does not have a protected right in violating the
constitution by long use, “[y]et an unbroken practice . . . is not something to be lightly cast
aside.”19 With an uninterrupted history of more than 200 years, it is clear the practice of opening
legislative sessions with a prayer has become intertwined within the “fabric of our society.”20
With the decision in Marsh, the court set a precedent in which invoking “divine guidance” upon
a group entrusted to make the laws is not considered establishment of religion, but “simply a
tolerable acknowledgement” of the beliefs widely held as “[we] are a religious people who[] . . .
presuppose a Supreme Being.”21
Over thirty years later, the Supreme Court relied heavily on the Marsh decision and the
historical continuity of historical prayer in deciding Town of Greece.22 The town of Greece, New
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York, had a practice of beginning the monthly board meetings with a moment of silence, but in
1999, the new town supervisor, Mr. Auberger, installed a prayer practice replicated from his time
in county legislation.23 In Greece, the invocation would take place following roll call and the
Pledge of Allegiance, after which, the speaker would be awarded a plaque for serving as
“chaplain for the month.”24
The speakers at these meetings were unpaid volunteers, and would be selected by a board
member calling all congregations in the town until one agreed, eventually compiling a list of
those who had agreed to return for a future session.25 While a majority of the congregations in
town were Christian – and all participating speakers as well – the town had a policy not to
exclude or deny an interested speaker their opportunity.26 Invocations given at the meetings were
not reviewed and most included a mixture of civic and religious themes while some were heavily
religious. A pair of respondents attended meetings and exclaimed to several members of the
board “that she found the prayers ‘offensive,’ . . . and an affront to a ‘diverse community.’” 27
The town responded by inviting a Jewish layman, the chairman of the local Baha’i Temple to
deliver prayers, as well as granting the request of a Wiccan Priestess.28 The district court found
that there was no impermissible preference for any particular religion, reasoning that the high
frequency of Christian speakers represented the population of the town, and there is no
requirement for the town to seek out clergy from congregations outside its own borders. 29
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Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 570.
Id.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 571.
27 Id. at 572.
28 Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 572.
29 Id. at 573.
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The Appellate Court, on the other hand, found some aspects of the program “conveyed the
message that Greece was endorsing Christianity.” 30 Further, the Appellate Court found that the
phrase “let us pray” and other invitations to join the clergy in the prayer “placed audience
members who are nonreligious or adherents of non-Christian religion in the awkward position of
either participating . . . or appearing to show disrespect for the invocation.”31 The Appellate
Court found the practice unconstitutional because of the “interaction of facts . . . rather than any
single element.”32
The Supreme Court was to decide (1) if Marsh permitted prayer that sectarian language or
themes, and (2) whether the setting and conduct of the invocations coerce people into feigning
participation.33
In the opinion delivered by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court held that the practice used in
the town did not violate the constitution.34 The prospect of generic and nonsectarian invocations
is irreconcilable with the facts, holding, and reasoning of Marsh, which has no suggestion that
the constitutionality of this practice is based on the neutrality of the invocation itself. 35 The Court
felt a nonsectarian requirement for all invocations before legislative sessions would force
legislatures to act as supervisors and censors – a far greater degree of involvement than the
current practice of allowing the speaker to write their own speech without legislative oversight
and criticism.36 When prayer is invited to public space by government, it must permit the speaker
to “address his or her own God or gods as conscience dictates, unfettered by what an
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Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 574.
Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 577.
34 Id. at 581.
35 Id. at 580.
36 Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 581.
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administrator or judge considers to be nonsectarian.”37 In spite of the large majority of Christian
speakers, the town of Greece was held to not have contravened the Establishment Clause because
the board made reasonable efforts to contact all congregations within the town limits and
represented [publicly] a welcoming nature towards any person who wished to speak – regardless
of their faith [or lack thereof].38 When a single congregation or faith amounts to a large majority
of the group’s speakers, it could show bias, but is presumed to be constitutional so long as the
town retains a nondiscriminatory speaker selection process. 39
While legislative prayer was upheld in Marsh, the respondents in Town of Greece, attempting
to distinguish Marsh and Town of Greece, argue that a town meeting, which is always open to
the public, is different from a legislative meeting in which people are entrusted to establish laws
of the people. The key difference is the regular appearance of citizens in the town meetings –
many of whom will be hoping to get favorable votes that night, and thus may feel pressured to
conform in front of the members of the board.40 Through the First Amendment’s religious
clauses it is essential that the government “not coerce its citizens ‘to support or participate in any
religion or its exercise.’”41 The Court denied this argument, finding no evidence of state
compulsion in participation of the prayer, but maintaining that coercion “remains a factsensitive” inquiry with consideration on the setting and audience of the prayer.42
The conduct practiced in Town of Greece is also supported by the long-standing history of
our nation which has included prayer before legislation since the First Congress; however the
Court must still consider “both the setting in which the prayer arises and audience to whom it is
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Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 582.
Id. at 585.
39 Id. at 585-86.
40 Id.
41 Id. See also County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, at 659 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in
part and dissenting in part) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)).
42 Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 587.
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directed.”43 For this matter, the Court had to evaluate the prayer opportunity against the backdrop
of the historical practice. This practice has lasted throughout our nation’s history, becoming “part
of our heritage and tradition, part of our expressive idiom, similar to the Pledge of Allegiance” or
the announcement of “God save the United States and this honorable Court” prior to the
beginning of each court session.44
As for the audience, while members of public may hear it, the Court – beginning with the
Marsh decision – have held that prayer itself is “an internal act” intended for the ears of the
lawmakers to set their minds for the higher purpose and ease of governance, “rather than an
effort to promote the particular religious values. 45 While the invocations were given, board
members stood and bowed their heads, and some even made the sign of the cross; however there
was never an attempt by the board members to solicit any member of the audience to participate
or make similar gestures.46 On a few occasions, regular citizens were asked to stand during the
invocation, but these requests would come from the guest ministers who most likely performed
their invocations in this manner on an assumption of inclusiveness and not coercion. 47
Under the totality of the facts, it becomes clear the prayer at the beginning of these
sessions is not a constitutional violation. The prayer was intended for the legislative law makers
in the audience and not the members of the public who happened to be attending the meeting,
which is well within the historical precedent set by the First Congress and the Supreme Court’s
decisions starting with Marsh. The prayer comes at a time when political moves are not being
made, but during the ceremonial portion.48
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Id.
Id. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693 (1984).
45 Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 587.
46 Id. at 588.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 591
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II.

Religious Symbols in a Public Setting

While religious prayer was held to be outside the purview of the Lemon test, the Court had no
issue applying the test to the new string of cases aimed at religious symbols. Without a precise
and formulaic test to determine the validity of the statutes in question, the Court focused on the
“three main evils” the Establishment Clause was intended to protect against – “sponsorship,
financial support, and an active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity” – and
developed a three-pronged test.49 This three-pronged test analyzes whether (1) the statute has a
secular legislative purpose, (2) the primary effect of the statute “neither advances nor inhibits
religion,” and (3) the statutes fosters “an excessive government entanglement with religion.”50
In Lynch v. Donnelly, residents of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, brought claims against the city
including a creche in the annual holiday display – an aspect of the display for more than forty
years.51 The display in Pawtucket was held annually during the winter holiday season and was
situated inside a park near the “heart of the shopping district.”52 The display included “a Santa
Clause house, reindeer pulling Santa’s sleigh, candy-striped poles, a Christmas tree, carolers,
cutout figures representing such figures as a clown, elephant, and a teddy bear, hundreds of
colored lights, a large banner that reads ‘SEASONS GREETINGS,’ and the creche at issue
here.”53 The creche featured the traditional figures, “including the Infant Jesus, Mary and Joseph,
angels, shepherds, kings, and animals.”54
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Id.
Lemon I, 403 U.S. at 612.
51 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 671 (1984).
52 Id.
53 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671.
54 Id.
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The District Court held the inclusion of the creche in the display violates the Establishment
Clause because the city’s purpose is attempting to “endorse and promulgate religious beliefs”
and further had the effect of “affiliating the city with the Christian beliefs that the creche
represented.”55 The statue effectively gave an “appearance of official sponsorship” to the
Christian religion and confers upon Christians “more than a remote and incidental benefit” on
members of the sect.56
The Supreme Court’s majority utilized the Lemon test to analyze the governmental action in
the town but further maintained its hesitance in committing to the Lemon test, or any other single
test, in this sensitive area.57 Under the three-pronged Lemon test, the Court found that the city did
not violate the Establishment Clause.
The Court identified that while the creche is religiously based, when viewed in the context of
the Christmas Holiday season, the creche depicts the traditional origins of the holiday that are
widely recognized.58 Analyzing the second prong, the Court found that such a display may
advance a religion in some ways, but held that such advancements in this matter were “indirect,
remote, and incidental,” garnishing no more advancement than Congressional recognition of the
Holiday itself, “Christ’s Mass” or exhibition of religious paintings in government sponsored
museums.59 Finally, the Court found there to be no administrative entanglement – there was no
evidence of contact between church and state officials during design or construction of the
creche, no expenditures for maintenance of the creche, and due to the low value (now $200) of
the creche, any tangible material contributed by the state is de minimis.60
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Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671.
Id. at 672.
57 Id. at 679.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 683.
60 Id.
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With the Court’s unwillingness to commit to particular test, Justice O’Connor wrote her own
concurrence attempting to establish a singularized test for Establishment Clause cases. Justice
O’Connor focuses on two main ways government can “run afoul” of the Establishment Clause,
either through excessive entanglement or by way of government endorsement or disproval of
religion.61 Justice O’Connor recognizes the Lemon test, but reiterates the lack of clarity derived
from the analysis of the test, failing to see how the three-prongs tie into the principles enshrined
in the Establishment Clause, and urges the Court to utilize the Endorsement Test and focus on
the intended message was and what the actual message perceived was – the purpose and effect
prongs of Lemon.62
While Lemon requires a secular purpose, that secular purpose must not be insufficient and as
such dominated by the religious purposes of the government action.63 Further, if a statute violates
any prong of the Lemon test, “it must be struck down under the Establishment Clause.”64 When
privately funded postings of the Ten Commandments appeared in every public school class room
in Kentucky, the Court found “no secular legislative purpose”, thus failing the first prong of the
Lemon test and making the practice unconstitutional.65 While a school might have a secular
purpose for posting Ten Commandment’s in classrooms – teaching a moral code, introduction to
a legal system – the Court was not persuaded by these arguments holding that “the Ten
Commandments are undeniably a sacred text in the Jewish and Christian faiths, and no
legislative recitation of a supposed secular purpose can blind us to that fact.” 66 Under
O’Connor’s Endorsement Test, the Court would analyze whether the government act was

Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-88 (O’Conner, J. concurring in judgment).
Id.
63 Id.
64 Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1980).
65 Id. at 41.
66 Id.
61
62
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intended to convey a message of endorsement and whether such endorsement “make[s] religion
relevant, in reality or public perception, to status in the political community.”67
Following Justice O’Connor’s analysis, the governmental action in this case would not
violate the Establishment Clause. Under the factors O’Connor proposed, the purpose of the
creche was not to promote religion, but a “celebration of the public holiday through its traditional
symbols” and further states the “celebration of public holidays, no matter the religious aspects, is
a legitimate secular purpose.”68 Justice O’Connor warns that analysis on the effect of an act
should not be judged on whether or not the act promotes or inhibits religion, but whether the
effect makes religion relevant in the political community.
O’Connor finds that while the creche does have religious significance, it is offset by the
entirety of the display within which it is displayed.69 Finding no clear intent to promote religion
on account of the government action and that the effect of the creche did not make religion
relevant in political status, the city of Pawtucket did not violate the Establishment Clause by
endorsing Christian beliefs represented by the creche included in its Christmas display. 70
Five years later, the Court addressed another religious symbol display in County of Allegheny
v. ACLU.71 When the county of Allegheny placed a creche inside the Courthouse atop the Grand
Staircase and an eighteen-foot Chanukah menorah outside the building, next to the forty-fivefoot Christmas tree, the Court decided to uphold one and invalidate the other. The creche in this
case was placed atop the grand staircase, the “main,” “most beautiful,” and “most public” area of
the courthouse, and is used as the background during the annual Christmas-carol program.72 The
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Lynch, 465 U.S. at 691-92.
Id.
69 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O’Conner, J. concurring in judgment).
70 Id.
71 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 579-81 (1989).
72 Id. at 579-81.
68
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menorah, on the other hand, was placed a few blocks away from the courthouse, in a public
display next to the Christmas tree.73 The menorah and Christmas tree were also accompanied by
a sign that bore the Mayor’s name and an inscription that read “Salute to Liberty.”74 The Court
discussed its’ distaste for the Lynch opinion because it fails to provide guidance for the analysis
of future cases, and praises Justice O’Connor’s concurrence for providing “a sound analytical
framework for evaluating governmental use of religious symbols.”75
After further analyzing the Lynch opinion, the Court decided to once again stray from Lemon
and use Justice O’Connor’s framework of the Endorsement Test.76 While recognizing both the
religious and secular purposes behind the inclusion of the creche, following the Court’s holding
in Lynch, the effect of the creche is subjective and is influenced by the surrounding elements,
thus a creche placed near a church will be more religious than if placed in a park.77
While Lynch and the present case both involved the display of a creche, the display in the
Allegheny courthouse is different because it lacks other symbols and messages to discount the
religious purposes of the creche.78 With no other symbols around the creche, the Court also
declined to accept the accompanying floral decoration as more than a frame used to draw
attention to the message within – and the message within that frame is that of the creche.79 The
Christmas carol program also does not offset the religious message for two reasons; first, the lack
of time the program was around the creche, and second because the carols performed are mostly
religious in nature.80 Finally, because of the location, in the “most public” area of the courthouse,
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Id. at 581.
Id. at 582.
75 Id. at 594-95.
76 Id. at 597.
77 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 598.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 599 (the carol program is only around roughly three weeks per year; the religious nature of the carols will
only further the religious message of the creche, not counter it by any means).
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a viewer of the display could not reasonably think the display was erected in such a place
“without the support and approval of the government.”81 Because of the county’s failure to
include some nonreligious method with their display of the creche, the display was enjoined for
“endorsing a patently Christian Message.”82
The placement of the menorah is upheld even though it is an overtly religious symbol. The
menorah “serves to commemorate the miracle of the oil” that burned for eight days and nights.83
However, like the Christmas tree, the menorah is much more than a religious symbol, and is the
primary visual symbol for a holiday with both religious and secular meaning.84 The close
proximity between the menorah and Christmas tree does not end the inquiry – if both are
celebrated religiously, by the city, they will both violate the Establishment Clause.85 If both
Chanukah and Christmas are celebrated secularly then there would be no violation, bringing the
court to determine whether the tree, menorah, and sign – all together – have the effect of
endorsing both Christian and Jewish faiths, or simply recognizes their prominence in the holiday
season and the secular significance of each to the people of this country. 86
When analyzing the menorah, we must look to its surroundings again. Here, the menorah
(strictly religious) was placed in close proximity to the Christmas Tree (secular symbol of
Christmas), and since the tree is larger and more central to the display, the proper analysis of the
menorah is in light of the tree, and not the tree in light of the menorah.87 “In the shadow of the
tree, menorah is readily understood” to be a reminder that Christmas is not the only traditional
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Id. at 599-600.
Id. at 601.
83 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 613.
84 Id. at 614.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 616.
87 Id. at 616-17.
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way to celebrate the winter-holiday season.88 As such, a reasonable non-adherent could not view
the menorah and Christmas tree as a dual endorsement of Christian and Jewish beliefs. 89
The Court was tasked with analyzing two separate Ten Commandment displays in McCreary
County v. ACLU. When two Kentucky counties posted versions of the Ten Commandments on
the walls of their courthouses, the ACLU filed charges alleging the postings violated the
Establishment Clause leading to multiple changes in the makeup of the displays, which were in
plain view of any citizen who used either building.90 The displays each involved the copies of the
Ten Commandments and various other documents with religious themes or an excerpted
religious element.91 The district courts’ analysis followed the three-pronged Lemon test, finding
the displays to violate the Establishment Clause.92
The displays failed the first prong because of the “distinctly religious” nature of the original
display – featuring just the King James Version of the Ten Commandments – which “lacked any
secular purpose,” while also finding the second iteration to violate the clause due to a lack of
secular purpose as the counties ‘revised’ displays were “narrowly tailored” to incorporate only
Christian-referencing foundational documents.93 A primary injunction was placed on the display;
leading to a third edition of the display, in which the counties argued they were attempting to
show history and educate their citizens, but the court enjoined the third edition of the displays in
each county.94
The Supreme Court once again returned to the Lemon test and affirmed, referencing Stone v.
Graham, and identified that the purpose prong of the Lemon test is important to the analysis but
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Id.
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 619-20.
90 McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 851-52 (2005).
91 Id. at 853-54.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 854-55
94 Id. at 856-67
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noted that the secular purpose requirement is rarely a determinative factor.95 The county argued
that “true ‘purpose’ was unknowable,” and a search for such was a procedural shield for courts to
“selectively and unpredictably” find evidence of intent; and as such, the counties asked the Court
to abandon Lemon’s purpose test.96 The court did not find the argument persuasive, highlighting
numerous examples of courts “examination of purpose.”97
The Court also denied the counties’ arguments which suggested only the final iteration of the
display be considered in the analysis, finding no case law in support of their position and
precedent that “sensibly forbid an observer ‘to turn a blind eye to the context in which [the]
policy arose’.”98 Ultimately, the Court found a “predominately religious purpose” behind the
counties’ evolution of the display while also upholding the preliminary injunction, determining
the district court did not abuse its discretion. 99
The Court then heard and decided Van Orden v. Perry, this time upholding the presentation
of the Ten Commandments on the grounds of the Texas State Capital. 100 The grounds encompass
twenty-two acres and house “seventeen monuments and twenty-one historical markers
commemorating the ‘people, ideals, and events that compose Texan history.’” 101 The monolith in
question prominently displays the Ten Commandments, but also consists of an eagle with the
American Flag, “an eye inside of a pyramid,” small tablets with possibly ancient text, “two Stars
of David, and the superimposed Greek letters Chi and Rho, which represent Christ.” 102 The State
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Id. at 858-59. See generally; Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
McCreary, 465 U.S. at 861
97 Id. The purpose is “staple of statutory interpretation.” See General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v.Cline, 540 U.S.
581 (2004). And the examination of governmental purpose is a key element in constitutional doctrine. See Church of
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)).
98 McCreary, 465 U.S. at 866; see Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 315 (2000).
99 Id. at 881.
100 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681 (2005).
101 Id. (quoting Tex. H. Con. Res. 38, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (2001)).
102 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 681.
96
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accepted the monument from the Fraternal Order of Eagles of Texas and selected the placement
“based on the recommendation of the state organization responsible for maintaining Capitol
grounds.103
When Thomas Van Orden brought claim that the monument violated the Establishment
Clause, the District Court was not convinced. Finding “the State had a valid secular purpose in
recognizing and commending the Eagles for their efforts to reduce juvenile delinquency” and
that a reasonable viewer “would not conclude that this passive monument conveyed the message
that the State was seeking to endorse religion.”104 Neither the Court of Appeals, nor the Supreme
Court could be persuaded to reverse the District Courts’ decision.105
The Supreme Court did not follow the Lemon test and focused on “the nature of the
monument and by our Nation’s history.”106 In this light, the Court found the display to be
constitutional, noting the commonality of similar displays across the country as well as the
Supreme Court itself.107 “Similar acknowledgments can be seen throughout a visitor’s tour of our
Nation’s Capital.”108 While the Court acknowledged the religious nature of the Ten
Commandments, it also recognized an “undeniable historical meaning” behind them due to
Moses’ position as a lawgiver, and noted that containing religious content or promoting a
message parallel to religious ideals does not per se violate the Establishment Clause.109 The
grounds of the Texas State Capitol have been decorated with monuments which represent the

103

Id. at 682.
Id.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 686.
107 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 688 (stating that Moses and the Ten Commandments are located inside and outside of
courtroom as well as outside of the building).
108 Id. at 689.
109 Id. at 690. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S., at 680, 687; Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S., at 792.
104
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several strands in the State’s political and legal history – giving the Ten Commandments
monument the dual purpose of both religion and government. 110
Justice Breyer focused his analysis on the context of the display in an attempt to understand
the message it conveys.111 Justice Breyer held that the religious message of the Ten
Commandments was outweighed by the secular message of the monument.112 Justice Breyer also
considered the monument’s placement which suggested nothing sacred as it was one of
seventeen monuments and twenty-one historical markers located on the twenty-two acre
property.113 Finally, Justice Breyer was swayed by the forty year history of the monument before
this single complaint was filed.114 Justice Breyer could not settle on a single test to use, and
instead considered the “basic principles of the First Amendments Religion Clauses” where
upholding the practice may be an endorsement, but a holding against the display could lead the
Court to be hostile to religion in the future. 115
III.

Was American Legion Only Possible Because of Town of Greece v. Galloway?

After these four symbol cases – Lynch, Allegheny, McCreary, and Van Orden – the Court
then decided Town of Greece. During the analysis, the Court did not use Lemon, nor did it use
Justice O’Connor’s Endorsement Test, but instead relied on the historical tradition precedent set
in Marsh. Effectively, Town of Greece enables religious leaders to give prayers so long as the
selection process is fair and open to anyone who may desire to do so.

110

Id. at 691-92.
Id. at 701 (Breyer, J. concurring in judgment).
112 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 701.
113 Id. at 702.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 704.
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Four years after Town of Greece was decided, the Court granted certiorari in American
Legion v. American Humanist Association.116 The Bladensburg Peace Cross stood tribute to local
soldiers who fell fighting for The United States of America during World War I. 117 Being erected
in 1925, the monument cross stood for eighty-nine years before a lawsuit was filed, “claiming
that they are offended by the sight of the memorial on public land” and the expenditure of public
funds on public land violates the Establishment Clause.118 The project was initiated in 1918 buy
the residents of Prince George’s County, Maryland, and the committee selected the plain Latin
Cross had become an unofficial symbol of war. 119 Safe on this side of the Atlantic, Americans
were bombarded with images of white-crosses lining war graves, giving the committee the basis
for their decision.120
The monument was to stand along the National Defense Highway, which stretched from
Washington, D.C. to. Annapolis, Maryland, but when the committee ran out of funding, the
project was taken on by the local American Legion, which finished the monument – complete
with their logo and a plaque naming the fallen soldiers. 121
The lawsuit was based on the historical significance of a cross as a Christian symbol as early
as the fourth century and remains so till this day. 122 As time has passed, the cross has attained
numerous secular meanings.123
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The images from the war, rows and rows of graves marked with white crosses helped to turn
the religious cross into a “central symbol of the conflict.” 124 The idea of the crosses marking
fallen soldiers had been solidified in the minds of Americans so deeply that a War Department
plan to replace them with marble slabs was met with public outcry. 125 “These wooden symbols
have, during and since the World War, been regarded as emblematic of the great sacrifices which
that war entailed . . . and have become peculiarly and inseparably associated in the thought of
surviving relatives and comrades and of the Nation with theses World War Graves.” 126 Along
with the American Legion logo and names of the forty-nine fallen local soldiers, the cross was
inscribed “Valor,” “Endurance,” “Courage,” and “Devotion” further adding to the secular
message of the monument.127 As time has passed, the “Cross has served as a site of patriotic
events to honor veterans of World War I and other days of importance – Veterans Day,
September 11, and Independence Day – and even began a monument locale for future wars. 128
After eighty-seven years, the American Humanist Association (AHA) filed their complaint
seeking “declaratory and injunctive relief requiring ‘removal or demolition of the Cross, or
removal of the arms’” to form a non-religious obelisk.129 The district court found the Cross
satisfied both the three-pronged Lemon test and Justice Breyer’s analysis in Van Orden. Under
the Lemon test, the district court found the Cross to have a clearly defined secular purpose in
commemorating the fallen soldiers of World War I, while also finding a “reasonable observer
aware of the Cross’ history . . . would not view the Monument as having the effect of
impermissibly endorsing religion.”130 For the third prong, the court held that maintenance of the
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Cross did not rise to a level that would create the “continued and repeated government
involvement” to constitute excessive entanglement. 131
The appellate court found the cross to fail the second prong of the Lemon test because the
reasonable observers would view the Committee’s maintenance and ownership as an
endorsement of Christianity.132 While acknowledging many secular meanings associated with the
Cross, the appellate court felt the size of the monument overshadowed those secular meanings
because the placement made it impractical for passers-by to read or examine the intricacies of the
Monument.133 After Marsh, the argument was made that the monument should be allowed
simply for standing for ninety years, a long continuous practice, but the Fourth Circuit rejected
the argument as “too simplistic.”134
The Supreme Court formulated serious doubts in the near thirty year-old test developed in
Lemon, noting numerous examples of the Court declining to apply it or ignoring it outright. 135
This developing pattern made it apparent the Lemon test was not sufficient to handle the
challenge of Establishment Clause cases, and led to the Court abandoning the Lemon test (in this
case) for four reasons: (1) the cases often concern monuments, symbols and practices that were
first established long ago, making it increasingly difficult to discern the original purpose and
intent, and allowing Justices to draw their own interpretations; (2) as time passes, the purposes
associated can multiply and change – such is the case with the Ten Commandments which are
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heavily religious with Jewish and Christian believers, but also have a secular meaning as the
basis of most modern legal systems; (3) the message conveyed by the monument or symbol may
change, like the Statue of Liberty which was “a monument to the solidarity of friendship”
between the U.S. and France, but is now a “beacon welcoming immigrants” to the country; and
(4) when a symbol with religious ties has stood for so long, it may appear as an attack on that
religion to remove it.136
Following World War I, the Cross became a worldwide symbol for fallen soldiers, and the
United States Military adopted them for service awards for Army and Navy personnel.137 Today,
it is impossible to detect the true reasons behind the choice of the cross, whether it was religious
or simply a continuation of the imagery that the people had been subjected too from the war in
Europe.138 While contesting the Cross as it sits now, the AHA concedes that there are instances
in which a cross in unobjectionable, but they would have all cross based designs located in or
near cemeteries such that passers-by could easily make the connection.139 However, the court did
not buy that argument. The court felt a memorial need not be placed in or near a cemetery for
such a connection to be established – many soldiers bodies’ were not recovered and never
brought home and these monuments take place of gravesites for family members of fallen
warriors.140 Ultimately, the Court also considered whether the removal or reconfiguration of the
Monument, after standing for so long, would be seen as a hostile action against the religion – the
type of act prohibited by the Establishment Clause. 141 The Supreme Court agreed with the
appellate court that a long standing tradition is not enough to warrant a constitutional violation,
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but must be viewed through a historical lens.142 Important to the Court was the inclusion of
individual names of fallen warriors, for fear of incompleteness without the names, and feel it
natural and appropriate for survivors to honor fallen family members with symbols that signify
their life.143 While historically a Christian symbol, we should not be blind to the symbolic resting
place of which the Bladensburg Cross had come to represent, and as such, the cross does not
violate the Constitution.144
Factually distinct from Marsh or Town of Greece, both of which revolved around legislative
prayer, the Court did call on those cases more definitively than any others – certainly more so
than Lemon. The Court never fully bought the argument that the time the monument had been
standing should have been enough to win the case, but by leaning on Marsh and Town of Greece,
the court was able to reconcile the “history and tradition test” within the rest of the opinion – it is
unknown if that will become the standard bearer for Establishment Clause cases.
All the Justices were quick to discount Lemon but could not identify a singular test for future
Establishment Clause cases. Justices Breyer and Kagan joined in concurrence but maintained
there should not be a singular test for Establishment Clause cases and each case should be judged
on the facts in the light of the purpose of the Religion Clauses – assurance of religious liberty
and tolerance to all.145 Breyer and Kagan believed the cross to be constitutional because: (1) the
organizers were undeniably secular in deciding to honor fallen soldiers; (2) the values inscribed
on the Cross were strongly secular; and (3) the Cross was up in the same spot for ninety-four
years before one complaint was filed.146 Breyer and Kagan, however, do seem to feel the
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majority has adopted a “history and tradition test” with this case, but feel that is the wrong path
to take, fearing new monuments would be subjected to removal simply because it has not been
around long enough to establish the history.147
Justice Kavanaugh concurred wholeheartedly with the majority but wished to further
highlight the flaws of the Lemon test.148 As in depth as the Court was on this matter, the Lemon
test does not address the Court’s findings in one area let alone all five.149
Under the first category the court has established and relied on a history and tradition test to
uphold religious symbols and speech on government property – upholding legislative prayer in
Marsh and Town of Greece.150
Highlighting the Courts refusal to apply Lemon in a string of cases: Marsh, Town of Greece,
Van Orden, and American Legion, Justice Kavanaugh is urging the court to abandon Lemon for a
more simplistic test. Kavanaugh proposes to follow the overarching principles set forth by the
court: If a challenged practice is “not coercive and if it (i) is rooted in history and tradition; or
(ii) treats religious people, organizations, speech, or activity equally to comparable secular
people, organizations, speech or activity; or (iii) represents a permissible legislative
accommodation or exemption from a generally applicable law,” then the act is presumably
constitutional and does not violate the Establishment Clause. 151 Under the formula proposed by
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Justice Kavanaugh, the Cross at question in American Legion would be held permissible because
it is not coercive and is deeply rooted in history and tradition.152
IV.

Has Town of Greece Opened the Doorway for a Broader Acceptance of Religious
Symbols in Public Space?
The Court’s holding in American Legion compounded with the holdings of Marsh and Town
of Greece have moved the court away from the dreaded Lemon test. With the focus on history
and tradition highlighted in the three cases, we are definitively moving toward a broader
acceptance of religion and religious symbols in public places. The question is which formula to
move forward with, and in my belief, it is the idea formulated by Justice Kavanaugh in his
concurring opinion in American Legion. It provides for easy termination of any coercive
practices as well as multiple avenues to prove constitutionality of the challenged practice.
How would the Court handle these situations moving forward? What if this Thanksgiving,
November 28, 2019, the mayor of Newark, Ras Baraka, called for all religious denominations
within the city limits to donate a sign or symbol to a city-wide holiday celebration? What if
December comes and there is a menorah, a creche, and a kinara all sitting in Lincoln Park? How
would the Court handle a complaint regarding these three symbols? Would the analysis change if
the symbols were not in Lincoln Park, but say inside the city courthouse?
How would they change if the symbols were not for a holiday season, what if the City of
Boston erected a cross-like monument on Boylston Street – where the bombers attacked the
marathon? Would the city of Boston be enjoined from doing so, simply because the cross would
not have been around for long enough to establish a tradition?
If the Mayor of Newark called for such a display, I believe it would have to be upheld or
enjoined in its entirety as allowing some symbols and denying others would be viewed as the
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government advancing the religions with the symbols approved and an attack on the symbols
denied. Without a proper test, there is no way to isolate the individual symbols donated. What if
some denominations provide these religious yet secular symbols, while others are solely
religious? Could some of them be enjoined yet some be allowed? A partial injunction that allows
for some symbols but not others could be viewed as an attack on those religious as well as a
promotion of the ones the injunction allows – both effects would be impermissible by the
Establishment Clause. If there is no Lemon test anymore, would the court look back to Town of
Greece? The Court in Town of Greece would most likely uphold the practice in Newark. The
practice in Town of Greece was upheld because it was inclusive and open to anyone whom
wished to participate, just as the request from Mayor Baraka. He would be attempting to bring all
people together, to share their beliefs, and learn from each other.
Under this proposal from Mayor Baraka no persons, symbols, or displays would be banned –
as banning one and upholding others would possibly be viewed as an attack on the religion of the
symbol that is struck down. The locale of such a grand display would not matter as much as in
County of Allegheny because of the volume and variety of symbols that would be displayed
together. The display inside the courthouse in County of Allegheny was held to be
unconstitutional primarily due to the isolated nature and prominent display of the Creche inside
the courthouse. The county placed the creche alone at the top of the main staircase in order to
virtually assure any visitor to the building would witness the display – a borderline coercive
tactic. Further, the county added framing materials, plants, lights, etc. to the display in order to
draw more attention to the creche. These elements would be absent from the Newark display as
Mayor Baraka would want to unify the city and bring all people and faiths together in celebration
of the holiday season.
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As for the City of Boston, what if a citizen challenges it immediately? Would they have to
find another way to honor the fallen? Now if it goes unchallenged for over ninety years, could it
stay just because of its tradition and historical relevance? If it is not the city trying to raise it, but
the family members of fallen victims, could the city deny the construction permits, or would that
be an attack on religion?
Under the Courts’ decision in American Legion it is uncertain and further, under Justice
Kavanaugh’s approach, the Boylston Street Cross could go either way. Justice Kavanaugh
focused on the historical relevance and tradition of the Peace Cross in American Legion, and the
ninety-year history of the Cross helped him uphold the practice. With a new cross, such as the
Boylston Street Cross, there would not be decades upon decades of history surrounding the Cross
itself; but there is a National tradition of memorializing fallen citizens with similar monuments.
When applying the history and traditions test, do you take into account the practice as a
whole – memorializing fallen citizens with a Cross, or just the individual practice – the particular
cross at hand? The court set precedent to consider the entire history of the display in McCreary
County when the court analyzed all three iterations of the display in order to ascertain the
purpose of the Ten Commandment displays. On the other hand, the Court strayed from relying
on a history of commemorating American citizens in this manner when deciding American
Legion.
When looking at the practice as a whole, there is no reason to think the City of Boston would
be enjoined from erecting the Boylston Street Cross in remembrance of those who lost their lives
as a result of the Boston Marathon Bombing that occurred on April 15, 2013. If just the
individual practice is considered, however, the City of Boston will have a near impossible task to
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prove the tradition and historical precedent surrounding the Cross, especially if a complaint is
filed within the first fifty-years of the Cross’ existence.
As you can see, the Courts’ decisions in Town of Greece v. Galloway and subsequently
American Legion v. American Humanist Association left us without a proper guideline with
regards to Establishment Clause questions, opening the door for a rampant rise in the
governmental involvement in the display of religiously linked symbols.
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